Students of philosophy are, rather, encouraged to work out the true intelligible order underlying the visible heaven and audible music. For in addition, the internal structure of each kind of entity has to be determined. That the Good is nowhere subjected to such treatment must be due to the enormity of the task involved in undertaking a systematic identification of all that is good, and in distinguishing good things from each other, as well as from the Form of the Good.
The Lysis shares its basic assumption concerning the intermediary state of human nature between good and bad, and regards need as the basis of friendship. That the discussion does not end here but occupies six more books, is due most of all to several loose ends that need to be tied up.
If there are differences between them, they concern the kinds of study and occupation that are deemed appropriate to philosophy. It is rational to act justly because acting justly is the best available means of maximizing desire satisfaction. This seems to be much like our conception of integrity.
Nevertheless, as witnessed by the Philebus, the Statesman, the Timaeus, and the Laws, Plato never lost interest in the question of what conditions are necessary for a good human life. This comparison is echoed later in the comparison of the soul to a multiform beast, where reason just barely controls the hydra-like heads of the appetites, and then only with the aid of a lion-like spirit c—d.
Similarly, in the Charmides Socrates addresses—somewhat ironically—the nature of moderation with the two of the Thirty Tyrants, namely the then very young Charmides, an alleged model of modesty, and his guardian and intellectual mentor, Critias.